От Ильича до Ильича
by sonnet 2006 이글루스 TOP 100 2007 이글루스 TOP 100 2008 이글루스 TOP 100 2009 이글루스 TOP 100 2010 이글루스 TOP 100 2011 이글루스 TOP 100
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태그 : SOVA
2008/03/04   NATO-Warsaw Pact 군비지출 비교 [28]
2006/11/10   해설: Robert Gates vs. SOViet Analysis [2]
2006/11/10   Robert Gates vs. SOViet Analysis [4]
NATO-Warsaw Pact 군비지출 비교
바르샤바 조약군의 기갑전력에 대한 80년대의 서방측 시각 (길 잃은 어린양)
합중국의 엄살 - 소련 탱크가 안뚫려염! (shaind)

여러 대인들께서 냉전 말기의 동서 진영 비교에 대한 포스팅을 올려 주셔서 감사히 잘 봤습니다.
이런 재미있는 이야기라면 당 검역소도 거들지 않을 수 없지요.


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냉전이 시작되자 마자 미국은 CIA를 만들어 소련의 GNP와 군비지출을 추정하기 시작합니다. 소련은 원래 통계를 잘 공개하지 않는데다가, 통계 자체가 워낙 엉망진창(혹은 조작)이어서 액면 그대로는 믿기 힘들었기 때문이었죠.

이 때, CIA는 소련의 군비지출을 밝혀내기 위해 우선 두 가지 방법을 시도합니다. 하나는 거시, 다른 하나는 미시입니다. 거시 접근은 소련이 내놓은 통계를 분석해서 그 안에 민간분야로 위장된 군비지출을 찾아낸 다음 공식 군비지출과 더하면 이론상으로는 소련의 군비지출이 나올 것이란 겁니다. 반면 미시 접근은 탱크나 비행기 한 대의 가격에서부터 장교와 병사들의 급여, 훈련과 유지비까지 다 따로따로 구해서 몽땅 더하면 어떻게 되지 않겠냐는 것이었죠.

두 방법 모두 많은 문제가 있었지만, 첫번째 방법은 원본이 되는 소련 통계의 신뢰성 문제 때문에라도 한계가 있다는 것이 곧 드러납니다. 소련이 CIA의 기법을 예상하고 통계를 갖고 장난치기 시작하면 대책이 없었던 것이죠.
반면 두 번째 방법은 광범위한 분야에 걸친 최신의 가격정보를 매번 훔쳐오고 업데이트하기 위한 엄청난 스파이 조직과 방대한 데이터베이스, 다수의 연구인력을 유지해야 하는 문제가 있었지만, 무한정한 자원을 때려붓겠다는 의지만 있다면 첫번째 방법 보다는 좋은 결과를 얻을 수 있을 것이란 판단을 얻게 됩니다. 대신 이 방법의 품질은 얼마나 많은 가격정보를 정확히 알아내느냐에 달려 있었기 때문에, 처음 몇 년 간은 가격표를 수집하느라 제대로 된 통계도 만들 수 없을 정도였습니다. 그래도 결국 대략 50년대가 끝나갈 무렵에는 어느 정도 쓸만한 결과물들이 나오기 시작합니다.

이 때 CIA는 소련의 군비 지출을 루블과 달러 두 가지로 계산했는데, 루블로 표시된 지출을 (공식) 환율로 곱해서 달러 지출을 구한 것은 아니었습니다. 사실 공산권의 환율은 공식, 상업, 암시장 그 어떤 환율을 택한다 하더라도 이런 종류의 비교를 하는데는 적절치 않은 것이었기 때문입니다.

CIA가 택한 기준은 "소련군과 똑같은 군대를 미국이 만들어서 소련 식으로 먹이고 입히고 장비시켜 훈련시켜 놓으면 도대체 달러로 얼마가 드는가"라는 것이었습니다. CIA는 소련의 모든 장비와 인력에 대한 추정가격표를 데이터베이스화하겠다고 달려들고 있었기 때문에 시도 가능했던 신공이라고 할 수 있지요.

이런 일, 즉 소련군 장비의 달러 가격을 하나하나 산정하기 위해 CIA는 방산업체들의 힘을 빌립니다. 예를 들어 어떤 소련군 병사가 트럭을 몰고 국경을 넘어 망명을 했다고 칩시다. 그럼 이제 CIA는 이 노획 트럭을 방산업체인 GM이나 크라이슬러에 주어 분석시킨 후 "이 트럭과 같은 물건을 1만대 구입하면 얼마에 납품할 수 있겠는냐"라고 묻습니다. 그래서 방산업체들이 입찰가를 산정해 주면 그 가격이 소련제 트럭의 달러 가격이 되는 겁니다.
그 결과 CIA가 산정한 소련 장비는 종종 GM이 찍어낸 트럭, 크라이슬러가 만든 T-55, 록히드 제 MiG-19 등이 되었습니다. 당연히 이들 물건은 소련제의 품질이 아니라 미제의 품질이나 고장률을 가지고 있었을 뿐더러 미제의 가격을 갖고 있기 마련이었던 것이죠.


자 이제 오늘의 본론으로 넘어갑시다.

CIA의 소련군비지출 추정치에 대해서는 늘 일정 정도의 비판이 있었습니다. 비판은 양 쪽에서 나왔는데 재야의 학자들로부터는 소련의 위협을 과장하기 위해 추정치를 부풀린다는 비판이, 행정부나 군수업체 로비스트들로부터는 추정치를 너무 낮춰 잡는다는 불평이 쏟아져 나오기 마련이었죠.

1970년대에 들어서자 의회와 국방성으로부터 CIA에게 미국-소련만 비교하지 말고, NATO-WP 비교를 해 달라는 요구가 점차 증대됩니다. 양 측의 동맹국들이 계산에서 빠져 있기 때문에 두 진영간의 비교가 정확하지 못하다는 것이었죠. 이러한 요구가 나온 출처를 보면 알 수 있듯이 이는 주로 소련의 위협이 과소평가되고 있다는 강경파들의 견해를 반영한 것이었습니다.

처음에 CIA 전략연구부(OSR)는 이러한 요구에 저항합니다. NATO와 WP 소속 국가 각각에 대해서 미국-소련 비교에 쏟는 정도의 공을 들여 달러환산추정치를 개발한 후 엄격한 비교를 한다는 것은 얻어질 이익에 비해 너무 부담이 크다는 것이었습니다. 앞서 설명드린 대로 CIA는 노가다 방식에 철저히 의존하고 있었기 때문에, 동유럽의 별볼일없는 2류 국가들을 분석하는데도 다른 좋은 대안이 없었던 것이지요.

결국 CIA의 군비지출계산 과정을 감독 조언하기 위해 설치된 셀린 위원회가 정보공동체 및 의회 스태프들의 증대되는 수요를 감안해 NATO와 WP 전력에도 관심을 가져야 할 것이라는 권고를 내놓고 나서야, CIA 소련분석실(SOVA)는 소련을 제외한 바르샤바조약기구(non-Soviet Warsaw Pact; NSWP) 국가들의 국방비에 대한 달러 환산 추정치를 계산하기 위한 작업에 착수합니다.

이 결과 1986년 4월과 이듬해 하반기에 두 권의 보고서가 출간됩니다.
* Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Defense Cost:1970-84, SOV 86-10019 CX
* CIA/DI, A Comparison of Warsaw Pact and NATO Defense Activities, 1976-86

이에 따르면 달러 기준으로 1976-86년 사이의 10년간 NSWP 국가들의 군비지출은 거의 일정했고, 미국 외 NATO 국가들의 지출은 천천히 증가한 것으로 나타났습니다. 하지만 이 기간 동안 달러 기준으로 미국 외 NATO 국가들의 총지출은 NSWP의 3배에 달했습니다.


그 결과 미국과 소련만 비교할 때 "앞서있던" 소련의 군비지출은 여기에 동맹국을 더하게 되자 역전 현상이 벌어집니다. NATO의 지출은 매년 WP의 그것을 앞서나갔고, 1980년대 들어 그 폭은 커져만 갔습니다. 종합해 보면 1976-86년 사이의 10년간 NATO는 총 3.5조 달러를 지출한 데 반해 WP는 총 3.1조 달러를 지출한데 지나지 않았습니다.

이 보고서가 정식 출간되기 1년 앞서 중간보고가 올라가자, 행정부 안에서는 이에 대해 비상이 걸립니다. 국방성의 유럽-나토담당 부차관보 John J. Maresca는 이 보고서가 "NATO가 WP보다 더 많은 지출을 하고 있고 그들의 투자는 차츰 줄어들고 있다는 왜곡된 시각을 끌어내고 있다"고 성토합니다. 그리고 NATO와 WP가 취득하고 있는 장비에는 질적 차이가 있고 운영 상황도 다르다는 것을 다룬 내용을 보고서에 함께 수용해 줄 것을 강력히 요구하여 관철시킵니다. 또한 CIA 부국장이던 Robert Gates(현 국방장관)도 이러한 양대 동맹에 대한 추정치가 "(미국의) 국방지출 반대파들에게 유출되어 악용될 것"이라고 주장합니다.

소련분석실장이던 MacEachin은 이에 맞서, 필요하다고 만들어달라고 했던 것은 너희들 아니냐면서 "우리가 미국과 소련만 비교했을 때 소련이 더 군비지출을 많이 하고 있다는 보고서를 냈는데, 이제와서 (동맹국까지 다 더하면 실은 우리가 더 유리하다는) 보고서를 출판하지 않는다면 지적으로 부정직한 행동일 것"이라고 주장하면서 싸워 보고서의 출판을 끝내 관철시킵니다.

말하자면 소련분석실 입장에서는 처음엔 잡일을 사서 하기 싫어서 뺀질거리며 저항했지만, 이젠 또 기껏 다 해놓은 결과물을 내다버리라고 하니까 참을 수가 없었던 것이지요.

그러나 이 보고서가 나가고 2년 안에 고르바초프가 소련의 군비축소를 단행하고 바르샤바 조약기구가 해체됨에 따라 더이상 NATO-WP 간의 비교를 계속할 필요성이 사라지게 됩니다. 1987년의 이 보고서는 동서 진영의 군비 경쟁에 관해 흥미로운 정보를 제공해 주었지만, 돌이켜 보면 너무 때가 늦은 감이 있습니다. 70년대 말에서 80년대 중반 사이에 동서 군사력 균형에 관해 많은 논쟁이 있었던 것을 감안한다면 한 10년쯤 일찍 시작했으면 훨씬 좋았었겠지요.

그런데 소련의 동맹국들의 군비지출이 계산에서 빠져 있기 때문에 (소련 측의 군비 규모가 작아보이게) 왜곡되어 있었을 거라고 주장한 멍청이들은 정말로 저쪽편에는 무려,

동독, 폴란드, 루마니아, 불가리아, 체코, 헝가리, 알바니아

가 있기 때문에, 우리편에,

영국, 프랑스, 서독, 이탈리아, 캐나다, 스페인, 그리스, 터키,
베네룩스3국, 덴마크, 노르웨이, 포르투갈, 아이슬란드

를 더하더라도 저쪽이 돈을 더 많이 쓰고 있을 거라고 생각했던 것일까요? 저도 냉전 후반의 분위기를 어느 정도 기억하는 사람입니다만, 이 아스트랄한 사고방식은 정말 이해하기 힘들다는 생각이 들더군요.


참고문헌

Firth, Noel E., Noren, James H., Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990, Texas A&M University Press, 1998
by sonnet | 2008/03/04 17:48 | 정치 | 트랙백(1) | 덧글(28)
해설: Robert Gates vs. SOViet Analysis
Robert Gates vs. SOViet Analysis에서 셀프 트랙백

이 글은 상당히 긴데다, 원래 미국 친구들을 위해 정리한 것이기 때문에 일부러 한글 주석을 최대한 뺐습니다. 따라서 한국인들에겐 좀 부담스러울 수 있습니다. 따라서 별도의 글로 약간의 해설을 붙이고자 합니다.

몇몇 분들께서 제게 이번에 럼스펠드 국방장관의 후임으로 지명된 로버트 게이츠 전 CIA국장에 대해 좀 써보라고 말씀을 하셨는데, 제가 보기에 로버트 게이츠 국방장관 지명자의 제일 중요한 문제점은 그가 냉전 말기인 80년대에 CIA에서 고위 간부로 일하면서 "아니 왜이렇게 소련이 비실대? 이래갖고 유권자과 의원 나리들 앞에서 국방비좀 올려야겠다고 말을 할 수 있갔서?? 잘좀 쓰라우야!!!"라고 하면서 소련의 경제력과 국방비 지출에 대한 정보보고서에 대한 압력을 가했던 전력이 있다는 것입니다.

트랙백한 글은 이 사건에 대한 CIA 소련분석국 SOVA(office of SOViet Analysis) 직원들의 회고담을 정리한 것입니다.

9/11 사건과 이라크전 대량살상무기 부재의 2연타로 정보부의 실패와 정보 조작/외압 등이 엄청난 정치적 쟁점이 된 현재, 이 이슈는 오래되었지만 상당한 의미를 갖는다고 생각합니다.

美 Time지에 전 CIA 요원 로버트 베어가 What to Expect From Bob Gates란 글을 발표했는데, 이쪽도 읽어보실만 할 것입니다.

이란-콘트라 스캔들에 대해서는 당시에도 일선에서 활약했었던 淸國欽差 儡之導漏夫 中校께서 저보다 훨씬 잘 설명해주실 수 있다고 생각합니다. 그 분의 작품을 기대해 보죠.
by sonnet | 2006/11/10 12:52 | 정치 | 트랙백 | 덧글(2)
Robert Gates vs. SOViet Analysis

Abbreviations

ABM
Anti-Ballistic Missile
탄도탄 요격 미사일

CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
美 중앙정보국

DCI
Director of Central Intelligence
美 중앙정보장(CIA국장 겸 전 미국 정보기관의 총수)

DDCI
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
중앙정보차장

DDI
Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
중앙정보국(CIA) 정보담당 부국장

DDR&E
Deputy for Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense
美 국방성 연구개발차관실

DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense
美 국방성 산하 국방정보국

DoD
Department of Defense
美 국방성

GNP
Gross National Product
국민총생산

JEC
Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress
美 의회 (상하원) 합동경제위원회

MBMW
Machine-building and Metal-working
금속/기계 공업

MEAP
Military-Economic Advisory Panel
군사-경제 자문 패널

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
북대서양조약기구

NIC
National Intelligence Council
국가정보위원회(NIE를 만드는 곳)

NIE
National Intelligence Estimate
국가정보예측서(미국 최고 권위의 정보평가서)

NIO
National Intelligence Officer
국가정보관

OER
Office of Economic Research. CIA
CIA 경제연구실

OMB
Office of Management and Budget, Office of the President
백악관 예산국

OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
국방장관실

OSR
Office of Strategic Research, CIA
CIA 전략연구실

PFIAB
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
美 대통령 외사정보 자문위원회

SAC
Strategic Air Command
전략공군사령부

SACEUR
Supreme Allied Command Europe
(NATO 산하) 연합군 유럽 최고사령부

SCAM
Strategic Cost Analysis Model
전략비용분석모델 (CIA SOVA가 사용했던 메인프레임 컴퓨터 기반의 소련경제분석 시스템)

SDI
Strategic Defense Initiative
전략방위구상 (레이건 대통령이 추진했던 우주 전쟁 프로젝트)

SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
스톡홀름 국제평화연구소

SOVA
Office of Societ Analysis, CIA
CIA 소련분석실

SSCI
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Congress
美 상원 정보위원회

WP
Warsaw Pact
바르샤바 조약기구


Managerial Support for Spending Estimates Erodes

Wider Use of Estimates Generates Distrust

Through the early 1980s the demand for CIA's estimates of Soviet military spending continued at a high level. The dollar comparisons of the cost of Soviet and U.S. programs were especially in demand; they proved useful in supporting the U.S. defense buildup during the Carter and early Reagan presidencies. William Kaufman, a longtime Pentagon consultant, recalled that during the Nixon and Ford administrations he "turned very strongly" to the CIA's estimates "as a basis for indicating why the U.S. defense budget ought to be increased." To this end the comparisons were inserted into the annual DoD posture statements.[85] They also appeared in Soviet Military Power, the DoD series documenting various facets of the Soviet military threat.[86]

Indeed, the increasing use of the CIA estimates in the debate over the U.S. defense budget aroused suspicion about their integrity in Congress and academia. James Locher, a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the Selin panel "that there are a number of people who believe this analysis is intentionally misleading, that it somehow comes out to exactly what it is that the Administration would like to argue on Capitol Hill. I mean they totally reject it." Depending on what the United States is doing with its defense budget, either side of the "political spectrum—(will be)—unhappy with the analysis."[87] Writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Carl Jacobsen charged that the level of CIA's dollar estimates of Soviet military program costs coupled with high rates of growth of these costs "were seen to legitimize and compel the Reagan Administration's historically unprecedented defense budget increases."[88] Holzman asserted that "over the past 15 years, the CIA's estimates have been riddled with errors and misrepresentations, all making Soviet defense expenditures appear larger than they actually are."[89] On the other hand, Rosefielde wrote in 1982, "my impression is that the political pressures on the CIA to keep their estimates low are very strong."[90]


Agency's New Senior Managers Skeptical

When Casey became DCI in 1981 he was not on record regarding CIA's estimates of Soviet defense spending. Early on, however, he indicated his doubts about the dollar estimates by asking Huffstutler how much could be saved by eliminating them.[91] Very likely, Casey's views were influenced greatly by those of Gates, who served him first as his special assistant, later as his DDI, and finally as DDCI. In 1984 when Gates was preparing to brief Weinberger on the latest dollar comparisons, which showed that the difference between U.S. and Soviet defense spending had narrowed considerably, he told Casey he planned to urge DoD to rely on physical comparisons rather than dollar comparisons of the defense programs.[92] According to meeting records, "the DCI agreed that this would be a better approach than using a lot of artificial cost figures."[93] Nonetheless, Casey kept his distance from decisions over the spending estimates and CIA's economic papers in general. Gates insists, for example, that Casey never interfered with the publication of any economic paper.[94] This claim is disputed by John Reynolds, a former manager of CIA's military-economic analysis, who reviewed this book in draft and noted that he personally drafted memorandums for Casey's signature refusing requests from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) for public release of CIA's dollar cost comparisons, even though they had been made available in earlier years. Both Gates and Reynolds could be right in the sense that Casey at the outset clearly intended to stop the dissemination of unclassified CIA reports.


Gates proved to be the driving force in turning agency management against the defense spending estimates. When he became DDI in 1981 he already had "some fundamental misgivings about some of the CIA's work on costing of the Soviet defense effort" based on the fundamental difference in the U.S. and Soviet economies and his feeling that sufficient data did not exist to make accurate comparisons.[95] He distrusted the dollar comparisons as only an "analytical construct" and pressed to substitute physical comparisons (numbers of missiles, aircraft, and tanks) for the dollar comparisons. He also thought the ruble defense spending estimates did not take into account the many ways the Soviet economy was skewed toward military purposes. "No one around town," he said, believes CIA and DIA when they say defense is only 13-16 percent of GNP.[96] Instead Gates said that, when asked, he would answer that the Soviet economy was about 15-20 percent purely military and 20 percent purely civilian, and the remainder could not be broken down into civilian or military components.[97] Gates's intuitive views were generally shared by those who followed him as DDI. In fact, his appointment as DDI signaled a marked change in the background and attitude of the people who occupied that position. Whereas DDIs of the 1970s like Proctor and Clarke came from intelligence backgrounds of military and military-economic analysis, understood the estimates thoroughly, and felt comfortable explaining what they meant and didn't mean, DDIs of the 1980s didn't understand the estimates and were not at ease discussing or defending them.[98]

Because of his discomfort with the estimates, Gates decided to commission Selin, then chair of MEAP, to establish a working group of outside experts, including some MEAP members, to review the utility and reliability of the estimates. As we have discussed, the resulting working group made several recommendations for improvements in the estimates, but it fundamentally endorsed them.[99] The group's findings were reported to Weinberger and, according to Casey, received wide distribution within the administration.[100] Still, the intuitive discomfort with the spending estimates and the apparent lack of confidence in subordinate experts persisted.


Estimates No Longer Helpful

The distrust of the estimates stemmed in large part from the lingering embarrassment over the 1976 major revision of the ruble estimate and the post-1982 controversy surrounding the announcement of the slowdown in the real growth of Soviet defense outlays after 1975. Gates delayed several months before approving the SOVA paper dealing with the slowdown, "awaiting the outcome of the Selin panel report and SOVA's work with DIA" (comparing CIA and DIA estimates).[101] In his forwarding memorandum to DCI Casey and DDCI McMahon, Gates said, "this is the paper over which I have had the greatest doubts," but he now found it persuasive because of SOVA's work on the Soviet economy and the endorsement of SOVA's economic and military-economic analysis by the Selin panel and the PFIAB panel, which he called "the two most far-reaching, comprehensive external evaluations of our analysis in many years."[102]

When the paper's findings became known, there was general consternation. The Senate Armed Services Committee, for example, canceled a major hearing because the idea of slower growth in Soviet defense spending generated enough controversy to make "our hearings less useful for our purposes."[103] Just as the concept of a plateau was being digested, DIA poured fuel on the fire by reporting in mid-1984 that Soviet procurement (valued in constant dollars) had increased by 5-10 percent in 1983 while CIA's preliminary estimate was 2-3 percent.[104] In testimony before the JEC, DIA was questioned intensely about this difference. CIA's representatives were grilled on the same discrepancy and testified that they disagreed with DIA on the estimates of physical production in 1983. They said the DIA estimate of spending growth was based on a smaller number of Soviet procurement items than CIA's estimates and that the DIA methodology overweighted higher growth items.[105] After a comparison of their respective estimates, DIA scaled back its estimate, but the 1983 upturn in procurement in the CIA and DIA estimates turned out to be caused by lead costs of future systems that were never procured at anticipated levels.

Meanwhile, the CIA/DIA differences were awkward for the intelligence community. In part they led Gates to ask whether the paper announcing the slowdown in Soviet defense spending should be delayed.[106] When the agency's classified dollar-comparison paper was published in March, the findings were leaked to the press—findings that were sharply at variance with DIA's estimates. To defuse headlines heralding a CIA/DIA split, Ikle arranged a March 1983 press conference involving DoD, DIA, and CIA to set the record straight. DIA and CIA reported their positions while minimizing their differences and cautioned that even with unchanged levels of spending, the USSR would buy enormous quantities of military equipment.

In 1986 when CIA and DIA testified jointly before the JEC, the two agencies still disagreed on trends in 1983-84 procurement.[107] Even so, the degree of convergence in views and the fact that the testimony was joint led some to charge that CIA and DIA had fudged their differences. In this vein, Holzman argued that CIA "may have moved, however reluctantly, to harmonize its published estimates of ME/GNP with those of the DIA."[108] Nothing so sinister occurred. The agency's estimate as presented to the JEC continued to show slow growth in real Soviet defense outlays until an acceleration forecast for 1985-88. The estimate of the burden increased because of the changeover to 1982 prices. Beginning in 1985, however, CIA/ DIA consultations over defense-economic matters were held on a regular basis with a revival of the Joint Military Costing Review Board, which met quarterly to review estimates and other work in progress.

From some consumers' standpoint, the finding that the gap, measured in dollars, between higher Soviet and lower U.S. defense spending was narrowing also meant that the CIA estimates were becoming a liability. Gates, already dubious about the utility of the dollar estimates, briefed Weinberger in July 1984. In a draft memorandum summarizing the sub-stance of the session with Weinberger, Gates referred to "future use of expenditure analysis by the Department of Defense" and noted "the use of the dollar comparison figures of Soviet defense expenditures by DoD to defend the defense budget was becoming less useful." He urged DoD to use physical comparisons of forces and procurement and noted that as the U.S. buildup continued, the U.S.-Soviet gap in spending would continue to narrow "and will not show the kind of gaps that Defense has used in the past to underscore U.S. defense needs."[109]

Weinberger and Casey agreed with Gates's recommendation to stop publication of the dollar comparisons. But this proved difficult, and soon problems materialized. SSCI asked for the defense spending comparisons, and a decision had to be made on permitting publication of an overall comparison of U.S. and Soviet GNP (including defense) for the JEC. SOVA began meeting with JEC staff about the upcoming DDI's testimony in November 1984.[110] Pressed hard by Senator Proxmire, Gates agreed to give the comparisons to the JEC. SOVA soon told Gates, however, that the JEC request was only one of many pending, including requests from the Department of Commerce, Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Deputy for Defense Research and Engineering (OSD/DDR&E), the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Strategic Air Command (SAC), and SSCI. A policy on release was needed, especially because some customers suspected that the decision to stop publication was based at least partly on what the trends showed.111 Requests from DoD continued to pour in. DIA sent a memorandum to the DDI asking for more detailed dollar comparisons. While understanding his "discomfort" with the dollar estimates, DIA said "unfortunately, no acceptable substitute has been found for the measure of the size, direction, and significance of the overall Soviet military effort."[112]

SOVA Director Douglas MacEachin recommended in January 1985 that publication of the dollar comparison be resumed, arguing that the past several months had shown that customers would create their own estimates and that CIA needed to again be in position to control the quality of the comparisons and state the proper caveats.[113] Gates reluctantly agreed. As he wrote to Deputy National Security Adviser Robert MacFarlane, "Recent developments have made it necessary to reverse (my earlier) decision."[114] "I wanted to apprise you of these developments because of the earlier interest shown by you and John Poindexter." But Gates promised changes in the dollar-comparison paper, including a beginning section comparing accumulated physical stocks of military hardware, inserting in the key judgments section of the paper warnings of the limitations and proper uses of the comparisons, and relying as much as possible on percentage rather than absolute comparisons. At the DoD, Weinberger was briefed by Andrew Marshall on the preliminary results of the latest CIA dollar comparison. He told Weinberger that the most important trend showed U.S. procurement overtaking Soviet procurement in 1983 and that DoD should be prepared to respond.[115] On the positive side, Marshall said it was unlikely that the USSR would return to earlier rates of growth of defense spending for any sustained period, giving the United States an opportunity to challenge the Soviets in a way they would be hard pressed to match.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s demand increased for an expanded definition of national security spending, on the grounds that the traditional definitions used for calculating U.S. and Soviet defense outlays did not capture the entire national security-related burden. Gates asked SOVA to research the question so that the dollar-comparison paper could include a "broader view of the Soviet burden."[116] This effort, described in the next chapter, increased the Soviet burden relative to that of the United States—measured in their respective currencies. The ratio of the cost of Soviet national security programs to comparable U.S. programs, measured in dollars, was marginally higher than the ratio reflecting the more traditional definition of defense.[117]

The minor relief that comparisons based on an expanded definition of 93 defense provided to defenders of the U.S. defense budget was offset by the results of an expansion in another direction—a comparison of the dollar cost of NATO and WP defense programs[118] which is discussed further in chapter 5. When DoD asked the agency for permission to give the finding to the JEC on an unclassified basis, DDI Richard Kerr demurred, saying he was reluctant to issue the paper in an unclassified form, and "in a form that will almost certainly be used against us."[119] SOVA replied that the agency should avoid being accused of selectivity (having already released the results of the U.S.-Soviet comparison to the JEC). In any case, "our dollar estimates have long been both in demand and controversial."[120] In reviewing the classified version of the paper, Gates, now DDCI, again voiced his concerns. Although he had few specific problems, he said it contained the same old caveats, which would be ignored: "One more time, our approach is an analytical construct, not a reflection of the real world." He predicted that the findings showing that the cumulative dollar costs of NATO defense programs in 1976-86 greatly exceeded the comparable costs for WP countries would be "precisely the part that will be leaked by the opponents of defense spending and used."[121] Clearly, high-level opposition to the dollar comparison was building again.

Intracommunity Disputes over Economic Constraints on Soviet Military Programs

Through most of the 1970s and 1980s an underlying tension existed between the analysis of the Soviet economy and intelligence community expectations about the development of the USSR's armed forces. A study prepared for the JEC in 1977 summarized the agency's views on the outlook for the economy: reduced growth with no easy options to prevent the slowdown.[122] Still, the implications for defense were hardly drastic, according to the paper: "The slowdown in economic growth could trigger intense debate in Moscow over the future levels and pattern of military expenditures. Military programs enjoy great momentum and powerful political and bureaucratic support. We expect defense spending to continue to increase in the next few years at something like the recent annual rates of 4 to 5 percent because of programs in train. As the economy slows, however, ways to reduce the growth of defense expenditures could become increasingly pressing for some elements of the Soviet leadership."[123] The message that the Soviet economy was in trouble, although not new, began to percolate in wider circles, causing some to wonder whether the economic difficulties could lead to greater Soviet accommodation in arms control and restraint in military programs generally.

A few years later an interoffice task force led by OSR tackled the question of what these military programs would look like in the 1980s. More than forty individual research projects contributed to a major report published in early 1981.[124] In the process OER argued that the paper's projections of defense programs for the 1980s did not take seriously enough the possibility that economic constraints would force slower growth or even a downturn in Soviet defense spending. The approved paper concluded that programs in progress implied continued growth in defense spending in real terms through the 1980s, although "political strains resulting from growing economic problems could lead them (the Soviets) to moderate the growth of spending, particularly late in the decade."[125] Alternative scenarios considered two versions of stepped-up military programs: one featuring strategic forces and other general purpose forces, and one in which spending was reduced. The paper warned, however, that there was no evidence that the USSR planned to cut military spending. All three alternative scenarios to the baseline projection were considered unlikely.

Undoubtedly, if the late-1970s CIA estimates of Soviet military outlays had shown the slowdown in spending beginning in 1975 that later estimates did, the analysis in The Development of Soviet Military Power would have proceeded somewhat differently, giving greater weight to the downside of the force projections. The 1983 SOVA paper announcing the slowdown, for example, thought it more likely that the Soviets would continue the trend of little or no growth in procurement "in the hope of strengthening the economy for a long-term military competition."[126] But the idea of economic constraints on Soviet military programs did not win many adherents in other parts of the intelligence community, partly because many thought CIA's analysis of the Soviet economy was too bleak. The PFIAB review of the agency's work on the economy was sparked by suspicions of this kind.[127] There was a desire not to underrate the Soviet Union's capacity to sustain the military competition with the West. Thus Rowen, NIC chair in the early Casey years, turned back draft JEC testimony prepared in SOVA and ordered that it begin with a listing of basic Soviet economic strengths.[128] Gates, as DDI, rejected a draft economic paper, saying, "The continuing litany of 2 percent growth for the 1980s has less and less credibility with me." What, he asked, is the potential for policy changes to improve the economy?[129]

In the NIE arena, the proposition that economic constraints would impede the implementation of ongoing military programs had even less weight. We have already discussed the one-sided debate over the strategic forces estimate (NIE II-3/8-85). The wide-ranging survey of Soviet strategic force developments delivered to two senate defense subcommittees by Gates and Lawrence Gershwin, NIO for Strategic Programs, in June 1985 illustrates the official view in the early Gorbachev years. They told the senators that the projected Soviet forces would "result in a growth of total Soviet strategic force expenditures of between 5 and 7 percent a year over the next five years," and 7-10 percent a year if Moscow decided to deploy ABM defenses on a wide scale.[130] Soviet economic problems, while severe, would not compel the USSR to give up important strategic programs or make significant concessions in arms control, although "the stark economic realities might cause some deployment programs to be stretched out." (The disparity between the flat spending on strategic programs of the recent past and the vigorous growth they projected for the future was not addressed.) Rather than using arms control to relieve economic pressures, the Soviet leadership would orchestrate its arms control policy to advance its "strategy of achieving strategic advantage" by limiting U.S. force modernization and blocking the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

When Gorbachev announced his plans for industrial modernization, SOVA pointed out the conflict between his program and Soviet military objectives, especially in the machine-building and metal-working (MBMW) branch of industry, which was the source of most defense hardware and the machinery and equipment required for investment programs.[131] Indeed, as we noted in chapter 5, Gorbachev evidently planned to step up the growth of defense spending in the 1986-90 plan period. Also, the high-technology branches of MBMW (electronics, computers, communications equipment) were being counted on to upgrade the stock of fixed capital in the economy and close the technological gap between western and Soviet weaponry. A March 1986 SOVA paper described this civil-military competition.[132] It said the near-term effects on defense programs would probably not be large but that a crunch could develop in the late 1980s or early 1990s because Gorbachev's chances of success were dim: "Unless Gorbachev's efforts to modernize industry pay off in greater numbers of more advanced, high-quality equipment and in substantially increased productivity, the battle between civilian and defense interests will become more severe."[133]

The Washington policy community's reaction to this message was mixed. The paper was briefed to Secretary of State George Schultz and Weinberger in the spring of 1986. Schultz was taken with the idea of an impending crunch and what it portended for Soviet interest in arms control.[134] Weinberger and his aides, on the other hand, thought the Soviet industrial modernization program, after a few years, would put the USSR in a better position to carry out its force modernization plans.[135] Even when it became clear that Gorbachev's economic program was foundering, there was generally great reluctance—whether within the intelligence community or in policy circles—to accept the idea that economic constraints would impinge seriously on Soviet defense programs.

In this vein, Gates, then acting DCI, asked in 1987 that a memorandum on the state of the economy focusing on Soviet strengths be sent to the secretary of defense.[136] The lead sentence of the resulting paper declared, "The Soviet economy, despite some ugly warts that make its operation costly and inefficient, is vested with great crude strength from the enormous resource base, and remains a viable system, capable of producing large quantities of goods and services annually, especially for industrial and military applications." The memorandum reported that even with no growth in GNP the Soviet Union could still spend the equivalent of $275 billion on its military. But zero growth was unlikely, and—although a relaxation of international tensions would help the modernization program "by freeing some resources that would otherwise be spent on defense"— Moscow had "the resources and the will" to increase defense outlays if the international climate did not improve. Industrial modernization and gains in living standards would be held down, "but it would not cause economic collapse or social upheaval."


The End Game

As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the support and rationale for CIA estimates of the cost of Soviet military programs evaporated. First to go were the dollar comparisons. In August 1990 a SOVA memorandum considered the pros and cons of continuing the dollar estimates and recommended their continuance while putting consumers on notice that they would be eliminated in one to two years.[137] By then SOVA had dissolved its Defense Comparisons Branch and put the analysts to work on other accounts. Shortly thereafter, SOVA provided talking points to DDI John Helgerson to justify dropping the dollar estimates.[138] Marshall in mid-1991 urged that the dollar database be maintained because it "has been a major foundation for my office's work on a military investment balance report that top defense officials have found very useful in characterizing broad trends in our security situation."[139] In his reply to Marshall, Helgerson reaffirmed his decision to discontinue the dollar comparisons.[140] Letters to this effect were sent to the principal customers of the estimates on April 1, 1992.

Meanwhile the effort devoted to estimating the ruble cost of Soviet defense programs was scaled back to free analysts to work on problems connected with the unprecedented changes in the USSR. The comprehensive SCAM database was mothballed in favor of a spreadsheet model requiring much less data and operating at a higher level of aggregation. The costing contracts were also dropped, and the agency's commitment to defense costing was reduced from forty-five analysts, managers, and on-site contractors in the early 1980s to fourteen in early 1992. CIA management wanted the ruble work to continue, but at a much lower level of effort. Ironically more than a decade of refining the Soviet defense spending estimates was marked by increasing official doubts and disavowal. Still, the post-1975 research developed an improved set of estimates of the cost of Soviet defense programs. We present these in the next chapter.


(Firth, Noel E., Noren, James H, Soviet Defense Spending -A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990-, Texas A&M University Press, 1998, pp.87-97)
by sonnet | 2006/11/10 12:33 | 정치 | 트랙백(1) | 핑백(1) | 덧글(4)
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