마수드가 CIA의 지원금 50만 달러를 꿀꺽하고 작전에 참가하지 않은 이야기

In the winter of 1990, Schroen reminded Massoud, the CIA had been working closely with the commander. Massoud operated then in the mountains of northeastern Afghanistan. Kabul was controlled by President Najibullah, a beefy, mustached former secret police chief and communist who clung to power despite the withdrawal of Soviet troop in 1989.

Moscow backed Najibullah; U.S. policy sought his defeat by military force. The Soviet supplied vast amounts of military and economic aid to their client by road and air. Working with Pakistan's intelligence service, the CIA had come up with a plan that winter to launch simultaneous attacks on key supply lines around Afghanistan. CIA officers had mapped a crucial role for Massoud because his forces were positioned near the Salang Highway, the main north-south road leading from the Soviet Union to Kabul.

In January 1990, Gary Schroen had traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan. One of Massoud's brothers, Ahmed Zia, maintained a compound there with a radio connection to Massoud's northeastern headquarters. Schroen spoke on the radio with Massoud about the CIA's attack plan. The agency wanted Massoud to drive west and shut down the Salang Highway for winter.

Massoud agreed but said he needed financial help. He would have to purchase fresh ammunition and winter clothing for his troops. He needed to move villagers away from the area of the attacks so they would not be vulnerable to retaliation from the regime's forces. To pay for all this, Massoud wanted a large payment over and about his monthly CIA stipend. Schroen and the commander agreed on a onetime lump sum of $500,000 in cash. Schroen soon delivered the money by hand to Massoud's brother in Peshawar.

Weeks passed. There were a few minor skirmished, and the Salang Highway closed for a few days, but it promptly reopened. As fas as the CIA could determine, Massoud had not put any of his main forces into action as they had agreed he would. CIA officers involved suspected they had been ripped off for half a million dollars. The Salang was a vital source of commerce and revenue for civilians in northern Afghanistan, and Massoud in the past had been reluctant to close the road down, fearing he would alienate his local followers. Massoud's forces also earned taxes along the road. (p.7-8)


마수드 또한 아랍 극단주의자들과 연계가 있었음

There were reasons to be skeptical about the value of such a liaison with Massoud. Most CIA officers who knew Afghanistan admired Massoud's canniness and courage. But episodes such as the $500,000 Salang Highway payment signaled that Massoud's innate independence could make him an un predictable ally. Also, while Massoud was not a radical Islamist of bin Laden's type, he had welcomed some Arab fighters to his cause and maintained contacts in extremist networks. Could Massoud and his intelligence service become reliable partners in tracking and confronting bin Laden? Opinion within the CIA was divided in September 1996. (p.10-11)


CIA와 마수드의 초기 관계: 마수드 소속 정당의 당수인 랍바니에게 지원금을 주었으나 랍바니는 잘나가는 부하를 견제함. 1984년 말 이후 CIA는 마수드와 직거래 라인을 뚫음

The CIA, honoring its agreement with Zia to work solely through ISI, had no direct contacts with Massoud during the early 1980s. ISI officers in the Afghan bureau saw the British "playing their own game" with Massoud, which provided yet another reason to withhold support from him. But the CIA did begin in late 1984 to secretly pass money and light supplied to Massoud without telling Pakistan. [37]

"He was never a problem in any sense that he was the enemy or that we were trying to cut him off," according to one CIA officer involved. But neither was the CIA "ready to spend a lot of time and energy trying to push" Massoud forward. Massoud swore fealty to Rabbani, but relations between them were badly strained. Rabbani received ample supplies from ISI at his Peshawar offices but often did not pass much along to Massoud. “Rabbani was not a fool, he's a politician," the ISI's Yousaf recalled. "He cannot make a man stronger than him." [38] Rabbani wanted to build up his own influence across Afghanistan by recruiting Pashtun, Uzbek, and Shiite commanders, securing their loyalty with weapons. In doing so he sought to limit Massoud's relative power.
……
As the fighting grew more difficult, Massoud had to admit he needed outside help. He refused to leave Afghanistan, but he began to send his brothers out of the country, to Peshawar, London, and Washington, to make contact with the CIA officers and Pakistani generals who controlled the covert supply line.
Among the items on his wish list were portable rations and vitanmins to help his troops stay nourished; an X-ray machine to diagnose the wounded; infrared goggles and aiming devices for nighttime fighting; radios to improve coordination among commanders; and, above all, shoulder-fre antiaircraft rockets to defend against helicopters and planes. With that kind of support Massoud thought he could force the Soviet back to the negotiationg table within six months. Without it, the war "could last 40 years." [39] (p.123-124)


마수드의 형제들이 워싱턴에 나타나 로비를 시작함(1985년)

For their part, politically savvy Afghan commanders began to understand by 1985 that one way to lobby for weapons and power -- and to outflank ISI's controlling brigandiers -- was to build their own independent relationships in Washington or Riyadh.
……
Those afghans who felt neglected by Pakistani intelligence tended to be the most active in Washington. … Gradually, too, Ahmed Shah Massoud's brothers and Panjshiri aids began to make the rounds in Washington. Massoud's now widely publicized record as a war hero in the harsh Panjshir gave him more clout and credibility than the Duranni Pashtuns, who tended to be dismissed, especially at Langley, as political self-promoters with weak battlefield records.

The CIA's Near East Division found itself under rising pressure to direct more of the money and weapons flowing from NSDD-166's escalation toward Massoud. Yet the agency still had only the most tenuous connections to Massoud. The CIA tended to view all the Washington lobbying as evidence of innate Afghan fractionalism, not as an expression of dissent about Pakistani intelligence policy. (p.130-131)


증대되는 미국의 아프간 게릴라전 후원금: 마수드는 이를 자기 정치자금으로도 이용해 CIA와 갈등을 빚음

Even by its own rich standards, the jihad was now swimming in money. Congress secretly allocated about $470 million in U.S. funding for Afghan covert action in fiscal year 1986, and then upped that to about $630 million in fiscal 1987, not counting the matching funds from Saudi Arabia. With support from headquarters, Bearden expended the CIA's unilateral recruitment of independent Afghan agents and commanders without the involvement of Pakistani intelligence. The money needed for such a payroll amounted to crumbs in comparison to the new budgets. The recruited commanders were asked to help the CIA keep track of weapons handouts, Pakistani corruption, and battlefield developments. The payroll had several tiers. A regional commander might draw an agency retainer of $20,000 or $25,000 a month in cash. A somewhat more influential leader might draw $50,000 a month. A commander with influence over one or more provinces might receive $100,000 monthly, sometimes more. An effective commander used these retainer not solely to enrich himself but to hold together clan or volunteer militias that required salaries, travel expenses, and support for families that often lived in squalid refugee camps.

Abdul Haq remained on the CIA's unilateral payroll, The CIA also continued to deliver payments and supplies directly to Ahmed Shah Massoud. (Unilateral CIA assistance had first been delivered to Massoud in 1984.) The CIA later sent in secure communications sets, allowing Massoud to interact with dispersed commanders and allies in Peshawar without fear of Soviet interception.

Bearden's Islamabad station expressed skepticism about Massoud. Some people involved thought it might be in part because of the testosterone-fed jockeying between CIA and the British: Massoud was a British favorite, therefore the CIA didn't like him much. [7] Then, too, there was a residue of distrust dating to the truce deal that Massoud had cut with Soviet forces in 1983. Bearden told colleagues that he respected Massoud's track record as a fighter but saw massoud already positioning himself to take power in postwar Kabul, hoarding supplies and limiting operations. "Ahmad, I know what you're doing, and I don't blame you, but don't do it on my nickel!" was the thrust of Bearden's message. A CIA officer at Langley told a French counterpart, referring to the agency's support for Hekmatyar, "Gulbuddin is not as bad as you fear, and Massoud is not as good as you hope." [8] (p.151)


마수드, CIA로부터 한달에 20만 달러씩 받아(1989년)

Bearden agreed that Schroen's Kabul group should take the lead in running the Afghan rebel commanders on the CIA's payroll. These numbered about forty by the first month of 1989. There were minor commanders receiving $5,000 monthly stipends, others receiving $50,000. Several of them worked for Hekmatyar. The CIA had also increased its payments to Hekmatyar's rival Massoud, who was by now secretly receiving $200,000 a month in cash. Massoud's stipend had ballooned partly because the CIA knew that Pakistani intelligence shortchanged him routinely. Under pressure from Massoud's supporters in Congress, and hoping that the Panjshiri leader would pressure the Afghan government's northern supply lines, the agency had sent through a big raise. The CIA tried to keep all there payment hidden from Pakistani intelligence. [1] (p.190)


Cole, Steve., Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York:Penguin, 2004

Whether bin Laden explored alternatives to exile in Afghanistan is not known, Mohammed al-Massari, a prominent Saudi dissident, recalled that he had often warned bin Laden that "Sudan is not a good place to stay. One day they will sell you to Saudis." He urged bin Laden to find an alternative base. At some stage that spring bin Laden did contact Afghans in Jalalabad whom he had known during the anti-Soviet jihad. "They said, 'You are most welcome,'" according to a Sudanese official. "He was like a holy man to them." Sudan's government leased an Ariana Afghan jet and arranged to aid bin Laden's departure. It required two flights back and forth to move bin Laden, his three wives, his children, his furniture, and his followers to Jalalabad, according to the Sudanese official. [31] (p.325)


At the time of bin Laden's arrival, Jalalabad was controlled, if not governed, by a regional shura of eastern Pashtun tribal leaders and former anti-Soviet guerrilla commanders. Many of them were involved in lucrative smuggling and trade rackets across the Pakistan border. They had resisted overture to join the Taliban but had also kept their distance from Hekmatyar and Massoud. Their most prominent leader was Haji Qadir, sometimes referred to as the mayor of Jalalabad. Their most prominent patron from the anti-Soviet era was Younis Khalis, now an octogenarian who took teenage wives. Khalis and other Jalalabad shura leaders maintained contact with Pakistani intelligence. [36]

Bin Laden certainly know some of the Jalalabad group from the 1980s and early 1990s, and he had kept in touch during his years in Sudan. He may also have remained in touch with ISI. It is notable that bin Laden did not fly into Afghan territory controlled by the Taliban. Some American analysts later reported that bin Laden had sent money to the Taliban even prior th his return to Afghanistan. [37] Yet bin Laden apparently did not have a comfortable enough relationship with the Taliban's isolated, severe, mysterious leadership group to place himself and his family under their control. (p.327-328)


Taliban forces launched a surprise attack against the Jalalabad shura in August. Haji Qadir and the rest of bin Laden's original greeting party fled across the border to Pakistan. The Taliban took control of the area, and bin Laden was now in their midst. The Saudi provided about $3 million from his personal treasury to pay off the remaining commanders who stood between the Taliban and Kabul. [45] (p.332)


[31] "Sudan is not a good …." is from "Hunting bin Laden," Frontline, March 21, 2000. the information from the Sudanese official is from the author's interview. This account tracks with multiple published accounts, including some drawing on afghan sources in Jalalabad where the flights landed.
[37] Interview wih Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service terrorism analyst, August 27, 2002. Washington, D.C. (GW)
[45] Interview with U.S.officials. Steve Levine of Newsweek first reported publicly on bin Laden's large payments to the Taliban, on October 13, 1997

Ibid.