От Ильича до Ильича
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캐네디-맥밀란 전화회담

1962년 10월 26일, 금요일 오후 6시 30분(미국 시간)

다음은 2004년 공개된 쿠바 위기 당시의 전화 녹음 테이프이다. 영국에 배치된 Thor미사일과 쿠바에 대한 안전보장 제안에 대한 언급, 중요한 일을 하기 전에는 사전 통보해 주겠다는 약속 등이 눈에 띈다. 영국이 미국에게 특수관계 국가인 것이 확실히 느껴진다.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan: Hello? Can you hear me now? Over.
WHCA Staffer: Yes, sir. I hear you very clearly and I’ll hand the phone to the President. Over.
President Kennedy: Hello, Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Hello. What’s the news now? Over.
President Kennedy: Well, Governor [Adlai] Stevenson saw U Thant this afternoon and made our proposals about the importation of arms ceasing and that work on these bases stopping and leading to eventual dismemberment. There are some reports around, some Russian conversations, but it’s rather unofficial and unreliable, about some thought that it’s possible they might do something about withdrawing the weapons if they could get a territorial guarantee of Cuba. But that is so unofficial that I’m not in a position now to know whether there’s anything to it or not.
Khrushchev told U Thant that he would keep his ships out of there for the time being but he wouldn’t do it very long. He isn’t giving us very much because actually he’s got no ships in the area anyway. But at least he’s made that an announcement. He’s keeping his ships out of there for the time being.
We are continuing the quarantine. The buildup of the [missile] sites continues, however, and I put a statement out this afternoon describing how the buildup is going on. So that unless in the next 48 hours we get some political suggestions as to dismantling the base, we’re then going to be faced with the problem of what to do about this buildup. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Well, as you know -- there was one idea you’ve just mentioned is that Cuba might be made, like Belgium was, by international guarantee, an inviolable country, which now all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability. Is that a possibility? Over.
President Kennedy: Well, that is a matter that, it seems to me, we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next 24 hours as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. That would leave Castro in power. It would leave the Russians, perhaps, free to ship in a good deal more of defensive equipment; and they’ve shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armored vehicles with very sophisticated conventional equipment and so on. But it may be a possibility. But I could probably give you more information about that by tomorrow night. But at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Yes, well, I thought another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with a team and ensure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussions. Over.
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations. That’s correct.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Yes, but do you think that U Thant mightn’t -- I’m quite sure that [Dag] Hammarskjöld would have done such a thing -- mightn’t he suggest to the United Nations that he will do this? He will go and do it with a team and see [unclear] not operable during the period of the talks. Over.
President Kennedy: Yes, there’s some suggestion of that. Also, they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida, in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Swan Island. That was -- it came up in the conversation with the governor. I’m looking into it. I don’t think we’ve got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect. But this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the governor’s conversation.
So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to, which -- and whether the Russians are interested in it or not -- we’ll know a little more, I would think, by tomorrow afternoon.
In the meanwhile, the quarantine stays. He doesn’t send ships in. We let a ship pass this afternoon but there’s no other ships within 48 hours or so, so we don’t expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued buildup, and I issued a statement on that today.
I think I could probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals and U Thant’s conversation with Stevenson. I’ll send you a report on that tonight and then you will have it in the morning. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: There is just a third point that occurred to us. If we want to help the Russians to save face, would it be worthwhile our undertaking to immobilize our Thor missiles, which are here in England, during the same period, during the conference? Over.
President Kennedy: I will -- let me put that into the machinery and then I’ll be in touch with you on that. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: I think it’s just an idea, but it might help the Russians to accept. Over.
President Kennedy: Good, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the [State] Department. I think we don’t want to have too many dismantlings, but it’s possible that that proposal might help. They might also insist on Turkey and Italy, but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that, that may be advantageous. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Yes, I don’t see why they should ask because we’ve got 60, so that missile for missile, you see, there wouldn’t be as many as that in Cuba. Over.
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s correct. Let me -- I’ll let Stevenson know that and he will have that in mind in the conversation. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Well now, if there are any other suggestions we can make -- you will probably send your message tonight and we can get in touch with you tomorrow. Over.
President Kennedy: That’s correct, Prime Minister. I think we just have to wait until we’ve analyzed this conversation. I haven’t seen the entire conversation, but I think that there may . . . and the prospect of a trade of these missiles for some guarantees of Cuba is still so vague that I’m not really in a position to say that there is any possibility of it as yet. Maybe by tomorrow evening at this time I'll -- we’ll know better.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Yes, because of course at this stage any movement by yours, by you, may produce a result in Berlin which would [unclear] for us all. That’s the danger now. Over.
President Kennedy: Well, we’re not going to have any problem at sea, because he’s keeping his ships out of there; and as I say, we let one ship pass today, for the very reason that you’ve named. On the other hand, if in the end of 48 hours we are getting no place and the missile sites continue to be constructed, then we’re going to be faced with some hard decisions. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: And of course in making those decisions, one has to realize that they will have their effect on Berlin as well as on Cuba. Over.
President Kennedy: That’s correct, and that is really why we have not done more than we’ve done up until now. But of course, on the other hand, if the missile sites continue and get constructed, and nothing -- we don’t do anything about it, then I would suppose that it would have quite an effect on Berlin anyway. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Yes, I think that is the difficulty. But [unclear] these political plans which we’ve now got going [unclear] I’ll send you a message concerning them, and you’ll send me the result of the U Thant conversations. Over.
President Kennedy: Yes, I’ll send you a memorandum based on the copy of the conversation that Stevenson had with U Thant. I will also keep in touch with you tomorrow at this time if you’re . . . Or, otherwise, I’ll send you a message tomorrow. Maybe I’ll send you a message unless we’ve got something immediate. And number three, we will not take any further action until I have talked to you, in any case.
I won’t bother to call you tomorrow, because I may be down -- I may be away from here tomorrow evening, and I assume you may be too. But I will send you a message if there’s anything new. And in any case I will talk to you on the phone before we do anything of a drastic nature. Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Well, thank you. I will be here all day so you can get me at any time today, tomorrow, or Sunday. Over.
President Kennedy: Prime Minister, I’m going to send you a note tonight or tomorrow morning about asking if it’s agreeable with you if General [Lauris] Norstad stay on until January 1, that there be an overlap with [General Lyman] Lemnitzer’s tour of duty; that Lemnitzer go over there and take over the American forces and be there and have that 60-day period to be sort of adjusted to his new responsibilities. You’ll be getting a formal letter, and I didn’t want to say anything about it because we haven’t been in touch with General de Gaulle as yet, who is very sensitive in these NATO matters. But I will be in touch with you and I would assume probably that suggestion would be agreeable to you? Over.
Prime Minister Macmillan: It is indeed very sensible. Over.
President Kennedy: Good. Well, I’ll be in touch in a formal way with you tomorrow on that matter, and I’ll send you tonight the memorandum on the U Thant conversation. Over. And I hope all goes well.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Well, thank you very much and of course [McGeorge] Bundy can always ring up [Philip] de Zulueta here. They speak to each other, so it’s quite easy to have a talk. Over.
President Kennedy: Good. Fine, Prime Minister, and I’ll be in touch with you very shortly. Thank you and good night.
Prime Minister Macmillan: Good night.
by sonnet | 2007/06/28 14:58 | 정치 | 트랙백 | 덧글(16)
트랙백 주소 : http://sonnet.egloos.com/tb/3255846
☞ 내 이글루에 이 글과 관련된 글 쓰기 (트랙백 보내기) [도움말]
Commented by 기린아 at 2007/06/28 15:07
전화가 멀리에서 들리는 소리라는 것도 있겠습니다만, 맥밀란씨의 이야기는 정말로알아 듣기 어렵군요. OTL;;;
Commented by sonnet at 2007/06/28 15:17
기린아/ 녹취록 필수입니다;;;;;
Commented by 기린아 at 2007/06/28 15:24
sonnet / 전 저 말을 알아들은 케네디가 더 신기합니다. OTL;;;
Commented by 이녁 at 2007/06/28 16:44
케네디 전 대통령은 목소리 듣기 좋네요.
Commented by 세리자와 at 2007/06/28 18:15
아날로그 암호기를 사용해 통화 중일 수도 있겠네요.
Commented by 백선호 at 2007/06/28 18:18
겨우 6년 전인 1956년 수에즈 분쟁 때는 미-영 관계가 최악으로 떨어졌는데 맥밀란이 다시 좋게 바꿔놨죠. 아이젠하워가 1942년에 지중해/북아프리카에 왔을 때 맥밀란이 이곳에 영국 정부 대표로 와 있어 둘이 이 때부터 친해졌고 나중에 아이젠하워는 대통령이 되고 맥밀란이 총리가 되었을 때 미-영 관계 개선이 쉬웠다고 합니다.
Commented by BigTrain at 2007/06/28 20:36
케네디는 정말 목소리가 좋군요. 그엔반해 맥밀란은 좀... -_ㅜ
Commented by 한교 at 2007/06/28 21:41
오 이런 소중한 자료를 ;;;잘 듣고갑니다
Commented by joyce at 2007/06/28 22:16
맥밀란 씨가 68세였군요. 소리가 잇몸으로 새는 듯^^
Commented by paro1923 at 2007/06/28 22:55
저는 맥밀란 씨가 뭐 군것질하면서 통화하나 싶었습니다...;;;
(특수관계 국가라... 하긴, 그렇겠네요. 영연방 네트워크 같은 것도 있을테고...)
Commented by 됴취네뷔 at 2007/06/28 22:57
STU같은 비화기는 사용되기 전인감유?
완전 4천마일거리에서 지상관제소 통제받는 기분?
Commented by sonnet at 2007/06/28 23:55
세리자와/ 예, 물론 비화기를 쓰고 있습니다. 저렇게 중요한 이야기를 일반 전화로 털어놓는다는 건 상상하기 힘들지요.

백선호/그래도 스카이볼트 사건처럼 시련은 간간히 있었던 모양입니다. 당시의 스카이볼트 보고서가 기밀해제되어 단행본으로 나왔는데 사놓기만 하고 아직 손도 못 댔습니다.

이녁, BigTrain/ 영국측에서 녹음한 테이프는 정 반대일런지... 하여간 케네디의 목소리는 알아듣기 아주 좋지요.

한교/ 녹취록이 없는 테이프들도 받아놓은게 좀 있는데, 손댈 엄두가 안 나네요 ;;;;

joyce/ 케네디가 특히 젊은 대통령이라는 점도 있어서 거의 아버지뻘 되는 나이 차이지요.

paro1923/ 미국은 영연방은 아니구요. 그래도 프랑스가 NATO를 때려치우고 튀어나가서 홀로서기(?)를 하는 배경엔 앵글로-색슨 패거리들의 짝짝꿍에 대한 특별한 감정 같은게 많이 보이죠.

됴취네뷔/ 비화기가 사용된 것은 맞는데, 구체적인 모델명 같은 것은 잘 모르겠습니다.
Commented by paro1923 at 2007/06/29 01:36
아니, 제 말은 국제 문제를 처리하는 과정에서 미국이 영국의 그러한 네트워크 등을
지원받거나 하는 것도 있지 않을까 하고 막연히 생각해 본 겁니다...;;;
(저도 미국이 영연방 아닌 건 압니다.
독립하자마자 영연방 탈퇴한 아일랜드와는 조금 틀린 사례이지만...)
Commented by 라피에사쥬 at 2007/06/29 17:03
괜히 1814년에 전화가 있었으면 어땠을까 하는 상상을 해보게 되네요. 백악관 태워먹고 남쪽으로 피난간 메디슨 대통령과 로버트 젠킨슨 총리와의 회담이라.. 하하[..]
Commented by あさぎり at 2007/06/29 20:26
맥밀란씨의 음성을 듣고 한순간 영어를 헛배운것이 아닌가 하는 생각까지 들었는데 그정도까지는 아니었나 봅니다.
Commented by sonnet at 2007/07/01 11:13
paro1923/ 아 네.

라피에사쥬/ #@!^$#**^%!

あさぎり/ 사실 테이프 녹취록 작성은 그 언어를 모국어로 하는 연구자들끼리도 논란이 많은 분야입니다. 우리 같은 외국인들이 굳이 찔려할 필요가.

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